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Abstract—In recent years, there have been many cloud-based
machine learning services, where well-trained models are pro-
vided to users on a pay-per-query scheme through a prediction
API. The emergence of these services motivates this work,
where we will develop a general notion of model privacy named
imitation privacy. We show the broad applicability of imitation
privacy in classical query-response MLaaS scenarios and new
multi-organizational learning scenarios. We also exemplify the
fundamental difference between imitation privacy and the usual
data-level privacy.
Index Terms—Model privacy, Machine learning services, Imi-
tation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decades have witnessed substantial improvement
in privacy-preserving machine learning. From cryptographic
based methods, namely Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [1]
and Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) [2], [3], to statis-
tical methods, such as Differential Privacy (DP) [4]–[7], local
(differential) privacy [8], [9] and its many variations [10]–[14],
most existing frameworks focus on protecting privacy at data
level. In data-private machine learning, a general goal is to
ensure that raw data information cannot be accurately identi-
fied from learning results. Meanwhile, an emerging number of
application scenarios involve a privately learned model, where
the general public can only access its functionality through
specific portals or interfaces. Correspondingly, a new concern
in contemporary machine learning is to protect a learned model
instead of data.
The ‘privacy’ of well-trained models is significant in that
valuable models tend to contain sensitive information extracted
from the underlying raw data or domain-specific intelligence
of the model specification. For example, the leaked infor-
mation from querying spam or fraud detectors [15] may be
adversarially used to attack those detectors [16]–[18]. Also, if
an adversary can mimic or even duplicate an already learned
model with few queries, service providers who trained the
model may suffer from the economical loss. A related example
is algorithmic trading, where traders may easily access data,
but sophisticated and successful algorithms are what truly
matter.
Model confidentiality is a particular concern in the emerg-
ing cloud-based large-scale learning services, e.g., Machine-
Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) [19], [20] and privacy-aware
multi-organizational learning [21]. These cloud-based services
can either build a private model based on users’ input, or
provide prediction results using previously learned models
through an Application Programming Interface (API). Often,
users can only access machine learning models in a black-box
fashion without knowing the model structure. Such pay-per-
query service makes the most advanced techniques accessible
to everyone, but it also put the valuable model itself as well
as the training data at risk.
Recently, several work showed that an adversary could
extract the servers’ well-trained models through a prediction
API [22]–[27]. In these work, an adversary, who may or
may not know the model architecture and the distributions
of training data, aims to efficiently and effectively reconstruct
a model fˆ close (typically measured by out-sample prediction
performances) to the API’s true functionality f based on a
sequence of query-response pairs. Note that the typical goal
of the adversary is to reconstruct a single fixed model for
a specific task. From the view of approximation theory, the
process of extracting a function is equivalent to a classical
function approximation task. It is well known that under some
mild conditions, with enough data (query-response pairs in this
case), a function can be well approximated. The approximation
error of the function may be viewed as a measure of privacy.
Furthermore, because the ML service providers in practice
will perform more than one task using the same underlying
model architectures and training data, an adversary may be
more interested in imitating the modeling capability. In other
words, an adversary aims to simultaneously imitate the per-
formance of ML Servers on multiple tasks, with the same
amount of side information from query-response pairs or
limited training data. Such a situation would be frequently en-
countered in privacy-aware multi-organizations learning, e.g.,
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Assisted Learning [21], where each organization intends to
assist others’ learning tasks unilaterally. Note that these tasks
may include those already learned by ML Servers or those
that have yet to be learned.
Our main contributions in this work are summarized below.
• We develop a notion of imitation privacy and its related
concepts to describe the emerging model privacy issues.
We discuss how imitation privacy may be used to describe
various existing methods in stealing a learned model for a
single task, as well as recent efforts in imitating modeling
capability for multiple tasks.
• We discuss how imitation privacy can be used to describe
the privacy leakage in privacy-aware multi-organizational
learning, which does not fall into the classical query-
response MLaaS scenarios. We provide several examples
to illustrate how the imitation privacy may be evaluated
and quantified. Particularly, we show that imitation pri-
vacy is fundamentally different from the existing data
privacy, and one does not imply the other.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we in-
troduce some background concepts and the imitation privacy.
In Section III, we explain related work in MLaaS using the
imitation privacy framework. In Section IV, we elaborate on
the imitation privacy in the context of multi-organizational
learning, exemplified with different perspectives.
II. BACKGROUND AND FORMULATION
A. Definition and Formulation
We first introduce some concepts related to supervised
learning scenarios. Throughout the paper, we let X ∈ Xn×p
denote a general data matrix which consists of n items and
p features, and y ∈ Yn be a vector of labels. The label
may represent a regression response, class label, calibrated
probability, or other statistics that depend on the learning tasks.
For example, in a regression task, we have X ,Y ⊆ R. Let xi
denotes the ith row of X . Let f(X) denote an Rn vector
whose ith element is f(xi).
Definition 1 (Algorithm). A learning algorithm A is a
mapping from a given dateset X ∈ Rn×p and label vector
y ∈ Rn to a prediction function fA,X,y : Rp → R.
An algorithm may represent linear regression, ensemble
method, neural networks, or a set of models from which a
suitable one is chosen using model selection techniques [28].
For example, when the least squares method is used to learn
the supervised relation between X and y, then fA,X,y is a
linear operator:
x˜ 7→ x˜T (XTX)−1XT y
for a predictor x˜ ∈ Rp.
Definition 2 (Module). A module M = (A, X, y) is a
triplet of algorithm A, observed dateset X and label y. For
a given label vector y ∈ Rn, a module naturally induces a
prediction function fA,X,y . We simply write fA,X,y as fM,y to
demonstrate such dependence whenever there is no ambiguity.
A module is an abstraction of a service provider in practice.
The label may be intrinsically owned by the module or outside
delivered. In the multi-task scenario, a task-specific label (y)
induces a corresponding prediction function. In many classical
MLaaS scenarios, both X and y are provided by users. In some
other scenarios, e.g., the assisted learning to be elaborated in
Section IV, X is privately held by the module, while y is
provided and varies with tasks.
Fig. 1: A specific scenario of imitation: an adversary imitates
a learned functionality f (for a single task) through an ML
Server’s API.
Now we revisit the problem introduced before by adopting
our notations. We consider the general machine learning mar-
kets where there are multiple participants (modules), and each
one of them can provide services and contribute to a specific
task. An adversary (Alice) is denoted by I = (A0, X0, y0),
where in extreme cases, A0 can be random guess strategy, X0
is purely random numbers, and y0 is empty. The ML Server’s
(Bob, denoted by M = (A, X, y)) model is fM,y i.e., the
learned model from label y. The adversary aims to construct
a fˆ to mimic the functionality of the oracle model, and
the closeness/accuracy is typically measured by out-sample
prediction performance.
Common ML Servers offer black-box access, meaning that
upon receiving queries (Xi)i=1,2,...,n they would only return
f(Xi)i=1,2,...,n. Therefore, to imitate the oracle function f ,
the adversary can build a local imitating model fˆ based on n
pairs of query-response. If the adversary knows any other side-
information, e.g., a family containing the oracle model and the
distribution of training data, constructing a imitating model
would be more efficient and effective. We summarize the
relevant information in the following notion of the information
set.
Information Set An information set Q consists of triplet
{X˜, y˜,S}, where
1) X˜ is the data sent to the ML Server.
2) y˜ is the returned information corresponding to X˜ .
3) S is the side information.
Remark. The input X˜ can be either real-world data or random
samples, either complete data entry or a partial set of features.
The returned value y˜ can be in multiple forms, such as class
label, predictive probability, and confidence score, depending
on different services. Notice that such information is different
from the side information described below, as the service
naturally returns it.
The S contains any possible side information for the adver-
sary to attack that is not obtained from interacting with the
ML Server. For instance, the information on the ML Server’s
learning algorithms is one type of crucial side information.
Suppose the model is a feedforward neural network. In that
case, the side information could contain facts such as the
number of hidden layers, the number of nodes in each layer,
the type of activation/loss function, and the optimization
algorithm.
Besides, the knowledge regarding the machine learning
service’s defensive strategy is also essential side information.
In the Model Extraction Attack literature [22]–[27], the infor-
mation regarding the data used to train the service provider’s
model is also a kind of side information. For example, suppose
the adversary knows API’s classifier is trained on Animals
Image. In that case, the adversary could use the same type of
images to train its own model, instead of using purely random
samples.
Based on the information set Q, the adversary will apply a
learning algorithm H to produce an imitating model fˆ . Note
that the returned values y˜ (e.g., labels or predicted values)
in Q is induced from ML Server’s underlying label y. We
summarize the above process in the following definition.
Definition 3 (Imitation System). An imitation I is a pair of
query set Q and hacking algorithm H that maps Q and any
label vector y to a prediction function fI,y : Rp → R (which
has the similar functionality as fM,y).
Remark. Any imitation I is naturally based on an informa-
tion set Q and a hacking algorithm H. Whenever mentioning
an imitation system, we implicitly refer to this dependence.
B. Imitation Privacy
We formally introduce the notion of imitation privacy. From
an adversary’s perspective, this value measures her capability
of imitating. From ML Server’s point of view, it measures the
privacy level of his models.
Definition 4 (Imitation privacy). The imitation privacy for
an imitation I and module M is
ρI,M = Ex,y∼pX ·pY |XEx˜∼pX˜L(fI,y(x˜), fM,y(x˜)) (1)
where pY |X is the task-specific distribution of label y, pX is
the marginal distribution of ML Server/API’s training data x,
pX˜ is the distribution of future data x˜, and L(·, ·) is a loss
function.
Remark. The loss function may depend on specific tasks.
For example, the loss function can be scaled L2 distance,
i.e., L(f(x), g(x)) = |f(x) − g(x)|2/|f(x)|2 in regression,
or indicator function L(f(x), g(x)) = 1(f(x) 6= g(x)) in
classification.
Interpretations. The inner part of Equation 1, i.e.,
Ex˜∼pX˜L(fI,y(x˜), fM,y(x˜)), describes the adversary’s ability
to imitate for only one specific task. The outer expectation part
(expectation over joint distribution) averages such capability
possibly over a set of tasks. For a given M, smaller ρI,M
means a closer imitation and less privacy. The minimal value
ρI,M = 0 is achieved at fI,y = fM,y for every y ∈ Yn,
meaning that Alice performs as well as Bob and there is
‘0’ privacy for Bob. This can be clearly achieved when, for
example, Alice holds both data and algorithm of Bob. The
privacy value is typically greater than zero when Alice only
holds side information such as a part of X (Bob’s data),
a transformation of X , or some other data that we will
demonstrate in the sequel. On the other hand, the value of
ρI,M is typically no larger than 1 for the above example loss
function, since a trivial imitation fI,y(x) = 0 for all x leads
to ρI,M = 1. As a result, it is expected that ρI,M ∈ [0, 1]
and it is crucial to keep a large ρI,M for the benefit of Bob.
In the definition of ρI,M, the closeness of fI,y and fM,y
is evaluated on unobserved data (through E). To enable easier
computation, the privacy may be approximated by the training
data X = {x1, . . . , xn} if xi’s are assumed to be i.i.d.
generated. In other words, E may be replaced with En, where
Enf(X) = n−1
∑n
i=1 f(xi) for any measurable function f .
The notion of imitation privacy may be extended in the
following way. For two constants ε, δ ∈ [0, 1], the module
M is said to be (ε, δ)-private with respect to I if with
probability at most δ, ρI,M ≤ ε. The module M is said to
be (ε, δ)-private with respect to a class of imitations I, if
infI∈I ρI,M ≤ ε with probability at most δ. The probability
is due to possible randomizations of I or M.
III. IMITATION PRIVACY IN MLAAS
There have been several works for imitating a single learned
model in MLaas scenarios, from different perspectives. We
briefly review them with the notion of imitation privacy. The
general goal of an adversary is to construct an imitating
model that performs close to a target ML Server/API’s true
functionality, as shown in Figure 1. The general ideology of
this line of work is that more side information (available to the
adversary) would lead to a more efficient and effective way
to construct an imitating model. In this scenario, imitation
privacy equals the average loss between ML Server’s target
model and adversary’s imitating model evaluated on out-
sample testing data (for a single task).
Extracting models with rich side information. The con-
cept of Model Extract Attack was proposed in [22], where
the authors developed two practical methods to precisely
reconstruct a target API. The first method, Equation-Solving
Attacks, is suitable for extracting Logistic Regression and
Multilayer Perceptrons, where the model structures are known.
For example, suppose that the target API is an already-trained
binary logistic regression with weight w∗ ∈ Rp+1. For any
input xˆ ∈ Rp, the API will return the predicted probability, i.e.,
f(xˆ) = logistic(
∑p
i=1 w
∗
i ·xˆi+w∗0). Then, in order to recovery
w∗, the adversary only needs to send p + 1 random vectors
and obtain their corresponding returned values and then solve
w∗ from a linear system. If the target is a decision tree, a
possible solution is the Path-Finding Attack, which works in
the following way. For any data point xˆ sent to the API, the
response is the node’s leaf-identifier that this particular input
entry reaches. This identifier can trace how the data traverse
in the tree and, therefore, infer the tree’s structure.
Extensive experiments were conducted, and the strategies
mentioned above delivered near-zero imitation privacy, i.e., the
API’s models were near-perfectly extracted, in most cases. The
main reason for such excellent performance is the rich side
information (knowledge of API’s model class, the predicted
probability, and leaf identifier) available to the adversary.
Extracting models with less side information. The above
two strategies have been empirically verified to deliver both
efficient and straightforward solutions to extract certain types
of models. However, they rely on the rich side information
returned by the API, e.g., the predicted probabilities and leaf-
identifiers. For classification tasks, many service providers
only output predicted class labels. Is it still possible to extract
the model with class labels only? The answer is affirmative.
An adversary learning-based solution was developed in [15],
where the context is to extract a linear classifier using only the
predicted class labels. The main idea is to first approximate
the classifier’s decision boundary, i.e., to find xˆ such that
w∗·xˆ+c ≈ 0, and then recovery w∗, c based on those boundary
points. It is conceivable that the number of data (queries)
needed for extracting a target model, in this case, will be much
larger than the previous one. The adversary typically needs to
train an imitating model based on the data pairs efficiently.
Training an imitating model. How to effectively and
efficiently train the imitating model? One crucial aspect is
to select ‘good’ training samples since those samples can
accelerate the training process.
Several retraining methods named adaptive training were
discussed in [22]. A solution is that for a given querying
budget n, the adversary first randomly selects m points and
trains an imitating model. In each round of the rest n−mm
rounds, the adversary will select points (via line search) that
are close to the decision boundary, i.e. point xˆ satisfying
w∗ · xˆ + c = 0. The reason for choosing those points is that
they are the least confident points for the imitating model,
and therefore it is essential to improve on those points. After
selection, the adversary will send these data to the API and
obtain the output values. Next, the adversary would update the
imitating model based on the new data pairs.
Efficient selection of ‘good’ training samples is conceptually
related to active learning [29], [30]. The relation was explicitly
drawn in [25], where the Model Extraction Attack was cast
into a Query Synthesis framework of active learning. For
example, to imitate a kernel SVMs model, an active selection
strategy was proposed in [25] to find points near the decision
boundary. To imitate tree-based methods, e.g., decision trees
and random forests, [25] used the technique of importance
weighted active learning (IWAL) [31]. In particular, at ith
round, we decide whether to query a data xi according to a
Bernoulli random variable with probability pi ∈ [0, 1] that de-
pends on previous unlabeled examples x1:i−1, queried labels,
Bernoulli realizations, and xi. Compared to the experimental
results in [22], to achieve the same level of imitation privacy,
more querying samples will be needed. In the above cases, the
side information is only the knowledge of the target model’s
structure.
Extracting models in deep learning. Several deep learning
techniques were adopted to imitate a target model. In fact, if
the ML Server’s true functionality is the deep neural network
and the adversary has much side information regarding the
ML Server, e.g., model structure and test/train data. Then
the model extraction can be viewed as one particular case
of Knowledge Distillation [32]. Knowledge Distillation and
related work [33]–[36] utilizes information from a complex
model (teacher network) to train a smaller one (student net-
work) with comparable accuracy. The student network will be
trained on ‘soft target,’ which is the teacher network’s output.
However, work in Model Extraction commonly assume that
there is little information on the API’s target model. For
example, in [26], the target model is an SVM or naive Bayes
Classifier already trained from MINIST [37]. They build a
deep neural network by training on the same dataset (but with
a different portion of samples) as the imitating model without
knowing the API’s model type, structure, and classifier pa-
rameters. They empirically showed that this would easily give
near-zero imitation privacy for the API’s model. The result
is conceivable since deep neural networks have a generalized
learning capabilities. The side information here only consists
of samples from the original training data distribution, but not
the knowledge of API’s model class.
A technique named ‘knockoff nets’ was introduced to
extract a CNN image classifier [38]. The extraction process is
based on the reinforcement learning technique. In particular,
each image used for querying is first assigned with a label
via unsupervised clustering. Then those labeled images will
be represented in a tree. For each time, the adversary will
draw a node at each level according to the probability from a
Softmax distribution over the nodes at the same level. After
reaching the terminal node, an image will be sampled from
this particular type of image pool. The adversary then sends
the selected image to the API, receives the response label, and
calculate the loss. For the imitating model’s architecture, they
choose deep models such as VGG [39] and ResNets [40]. In
this case, the side information is the knowledge that the target
classifier is CNN trained on image data, but not any other
detailed model architecture information.
IV. IMITATION PRIVACY IN ASSISTED LEARNING
The context of Multi-Organizational Assisted Learning [21]
concerns a group of agents with potentially heterogeneous
characteristics, data, and supervised models. We consider the
scenario where an agent (Bob) assists another agent (Alice)
with her multi-task learning, without sharing his raw data or
the model that he uses. In this setting, we define the oracle
performance as the optimal predictive loss that can be achieved
from all the data aggregated from Alice and Bob without
computational constraints. It may be notable (or may even
be counter-intuitive) that we will design a mechanism such
that Alice can still achieve near-oracle performance without
knowing Bob’s model and raw data.
Residual
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Fig. 2: Illustration of the two-stage procedures for Bob to assist Alice.
We illustrate the idea by a simple case where the data of
Alice and Bob are fully collated according to a certain data
ID, and they both use regression models [21]. Mathematically,
Alice and Bob observe data features XA and XB and would
like to learn regression functions fA and fB so that
eB→A = E(y − fA(XA)− fB(XB))2
is minimized, for a given task label y. Then, when a future
observation arrives, say x∗A (for Alice) and x
∗
B (for Bob), Bob
will evaluate fB(x∗B) and send it to Alice who will produce
fA(x
∗
A)+ fB(x
∗
B) for prediction. If Alice had full knowledge
of xB of Bob, she would form an augmented data xA∪B =
[xA, xB ] and directly learn from it to obtain an oracle error
eA∪B . Can Alice achieve the oracle performance (i.e. eB→A ≈
eA∪B) without the knowledge of xB? An affirmative solution
was provided in [21], which is outlined below.
As depicted in fig. 2, in State I (learning stage), Alice first
fits the data Y and sends the fitted residual eA,1 to Bob,
who will then treat eA,1 as his observed label and sends
the corresponding fitted residuals eB,1 back to Alice; Alice
then initiates the second round of interaction by fitting eB,1
and sends a fitted residual eA,2 to Bob, who in an analogous
manner sends a new fitted residual eB,2 back to Alice. This
process is iterated k times until a stopping criterion is met.
In State II (prediction stage), Alice sums up all her (private)
regression models calculated in k stages and forms fA, and
analogously so does Bob. This algorithm can be proved to
approach the oracle performance [21].
The significant difference between Model Extraction in
Section III and Assisted Learning is that in model extraction,
the goal is to extract specific models trained on the given
label. While in assisted learning, we aim to acquire the ability
of mimicking the functionality of module, which shall hold
for arbitrary label.
In the context of an assisted learning system, how do we
interpret and measure the privacy for the service module Bob?
Suppose that a user module Alice has no prior information
before contacting Bob in the Assisted Learning. The only
way to gain information from Bob (or “hack the system”) is
through queries at either Stage I or State II. Such information
is quantified below.
There are two components of a query set. The first com-
ponent is concerned with the queries at Stage II that aim to
hack fM,y(·) for a particular y. The second component is to
query Stage I in order to hack the internal functionality of
M itself. The positive integer k in our context is interpreted
as the communication complexity between modules. We will
show by examples that a joint query to both Stage I and II is
necessary to successfully imitate Bob.
Example 1 (Algorithm leakage). Consider a scenario where
Bob’s algorithm is not available to Alice, but Bob’s full
data XB and the fitted response fM,y(XB) are available to
Alice. Suppose that there is a small fraction of data that is
mismatched or overly noisy, and Bob uses a robust learn-
ing algorithm to circumvent those outliers in XB and learn
an accurate model. Suppose that Alice holds a rudimentary
algorithm that is sensitive to outliers. As a consequence of
observing fM,y(XB), Alice would be able to identify outliers
as those with significant gaps between fM,y(XB) and y. In
this case, Bob’s learning capability (in handling outliers) is
implicitly leaked even if Bob’s algorithm is not transmitted.
Example 2 (Data leakage). Consider a scenario where Bob’s
data XB is not available to Alice, but his learning algorithm
and fitted response fM,y(XB) are available to Alice. A learn-
ing algorithm will demonstrate unique information regarding
the dataset, e.g. column space revealed by linear regression
and data structure implicitly shown from decision Tree. In
some cases, Alice will be able to reverse-engineer some key
statistics of Bob’s data or even precise values of data, e.g. in
Example 3 and 4 of the next section.
If Alice is not a benign user, the above query set enables
her to possess useful knowledge from the service module
Bob. Simply speaking, Alice aims to provide assistance to
other users whatever Bob could provide, as if Alice had the
algorithm and data that Bob privately holds. This is formulated
by the following system in parallel to a regular assisted
learning system.
Algorithm for learning
Data
Module
Algorithm for hacking
Query set
Imitation
Label (Stage I) Prediction (Stage II)
Label (Stage I) Prediction (Stage II)
Fig. 3: A specific scenario of imitation: an Assisted Learning system (top) and its Imitation system (bottom)
Definition 5 (Imitation system). An imitation system S ′
consists of an imitation I from an assisted learning system S,
a learning protocol, a prediction protocol, and the learning
procedure based on I instead of M.
An illustration of the above concepts are included in Fig. 3.
We now give some examples to concretely demonstrate the
idea of Imitation Privacy.
Example 3 (Linear regression imitation privacy). Suppose
that in an imitation, the number of Stage I queries is k1, and
the numbers of Stage II queries are n1 = · · · = nk = k2.
Suppose that Bob employs a linear regression model and Alice
knows about it. By querying k1 ≥ min{p, n − p} random
label vectors y` (` = 1, . . . , k1) from Stage I, Alice can
obtain the column space span(XB) of Bob’s data XB with
probability one. Additionally, if Alice also knows about the
true covariance matrix of Bob’s features, Alice is able to
develop an imitation system with ρI,M = o(n−1), where n is
the data size (or the number of rows in XB). Note that Bob’s
data are never transmitted.
Explanation. Suppose that in an imitation, the number of
Stage I queries is k1. Suppose that Bob employs a linear
regression model and Alice knows that Bob is using a linear
regression. By querying k1 ≥ min{p, n − p} random label
vectors y` (` = 1, . . . , k1) from Stage I, Alice can obtain the
column space span(XB) of Bob’s data XB with probability
one. This is because in each fitting process, Bob will project
the random query yi onto span(XB), i.e. yi 7→ PXByi. Hence,
with k1 = p fitted values in the form of PXByi, i = 1, 2, ...k1,
Alice is able to uniquely identify the column space of XB
with probability 1. On the other hand, with n − p queries,
Alice will identify the orthogonal space of span(XB), which
further implies span(XB).
However, Alice cannot obtain the Bob’s data XB exactly
without further side-information. One such side information
is the true covariance matrix of Bob. Alice is able to develop
an imitation system with ρI,M = op(1) as Bob’s data size
n→∞. To see this, suppose without loss of generality that the
underlying covariance of XB is an identity matrix. Let Alice
arbitrarily pick up a matrix X˜ ∈ Rn×p whose column space
is span(XB). We only need to find such a Q that X˜ = XBQ.
For each label Yt, t = 1, 2, ..., p sent in Stage I, Alice can
calculate the empirical covariance between Y and XB , say
Kt ∈ Rp×1. By the law of large numbers,
Kt →p cov(QXB , Yt) = Qcov(XB , Yt)
as n→∞. If each query Yt is in the form: Yt = XBβt + ηt,
with some fixed βt ∈ Rp×1, then Alice could solve Q by
letting[
K1 K2 . . . Kp
]
= Q
[
β1 β2 . . . βp
]
.
As long as β is linearly independent, Alice obtains a unique
Qˆn that converges in probability to the true Q. Consequently,
Alice would use X˜Qˆ−1n as if it were XB to provide assistance,
with an op(1) imitation privacy.
Example 4 (Decision tree imitation privacy). Suppose that
Bob uses a decision tree with width 2 and depth at least p,
with p being the number of Bob’s features. Then with k1 ≥ n
and k2 = ∞, there exists an imitation such that ρI,M = 0
with high probability.
Explanation. Suppose that Bob uses a decision tree with
width 2 and depth at least p, with p being the number of
Bob’s features. Then with k1 ≥ n and k2 = ∞, there exists
an imitation such that ρI,M = op(1) as n → ∞. In fact,
in the ith Stage I query, Alice sends label yi such that its
ith entry is sufficiently large and all other entries are zero
(i = 1, . . . , n) to identify the structure of Bob’s data. From
the infinite Stage II queries corresponding to the ith Stage I
query, Alice is able to reconstruct the tree built by Bob, which
puts a mass at the finest neighborhood of xi. Finally, Alice is
able to reconstruct Bob’s data up to a precision that goes to 0
as n grows. Therefore, with k1 ≥ n and k2 =∞, by using the
strategy described above, Alice can create an imitation system
such that ρI,M = op(1).
In fact, there exist multiple ways to obtain the data structure
of Bob. Next, we demonstrate another way that does not even
need Stage II queries. Consider a one-dimensional case where
Bob’s data is XTB = [7, 1, 10, 5, 18, 9], and a decision tree with
width 2 is employed. We use xj to denote the jth entry in XTB .
Alice can obtain the structure of Bob’s data by sending queries
ei, for i = 1, 2, ..., 6 to Bob in Stage I only, where ei is the
standard basis for R6, and observing the fitted values oi for
i = 1, 2, ..., 6.
Input M−−→ Fitted Value
e1 = [1,0,0,0,0,0] o1 = [ 13 ,
1
3
,0, 1
3
,0,0]
e2 = [0,1,0,0,0,0] o2 =[0,0,0,0,0,0]
e3 = [0,0,1,0,0,0] o3 =[0,0, 12 ,0,
1
2
,0]
e4 = [0,0,0,1,0,0] o4 =[0, 12 ,0,
1
2
,0,0]
e5 = [0,0,0,0,1,0] o5 =[0,0,0,0,0,0]
e6 = [0,0,0,0,0,1] o6 =[0,0, 13 ,0,
1
3
, 1
3
]
From o2 and o5, Alice knows that x2, x5 are begin-
ning/ending points, and without loss of generality, we assume
x2 < x5. From o4 and o1, Alice knows x4 must lie between
x1 and x2. Similarly, the order of x6, x3, x5 can be inferred
from o3, o6. Therefore, Alice has successfully recovered the
structure of Bob’s data, i.e.,
[x2, x4, x1, x6, x3, x5] = [1, 5, 7, 9, 10, 18].
Note that without the information from Stage II, Alice can
never know the exact value or even ranges of Bob’s data. In
fact, it is straightforward to apply such kind of strategy on
complex dataset.
Example 5 (Restricted outcome imitation privacy). Sup-
pose that y is generated from
y = f(x) + η,
where η ∼ N (0, σ2) and f is randomly generated from a
compact space F with a suitable probability measure F and
metric L2(PX). The distribution of y conditional on Bob’s data
X , pY |X , is Gaussian with mean
∫
F f(X)dF and variance σ
2.
Then there exists an imitation I with
k1 = exp{Hd,ε(F)}, k2 =∞,
such that ρI,M ≤ ε with high probability. Here, Hd,ε(F)
denotes the Kolmogorov ε-entropy of F , namely the logarithm
of the smallest number of ε-covers of F .
Explanation. Alice can develop the following imitation sys-
tem. Let f1, . . . , fk1 with k1 = exp{Hd,ε(F)} denote the ε-
quantizations of the function space F . Suppose that k1 queries
are constructed in such a way that yj is generated from fj ,
namely yj = fj(x) + ηj , j = 1, . . . , k1. For any future query
sent to Alice, say y∗ = f∗(x)+ η∗, Alice can search from the
dictionary of yj , j = 1, . . . , k1, and find the j that minimizes
‖yj − y∗‖. Since
n−1‖yj − y∗‖2 = 2σ2 + ‖fj − f∗‖L2(PX) + op(1)
as n→∞ (assuming independent noises), Alice would obtain
such j that fj is ε-away from f∗. Consequently, when Alice
uses the Stage II queries corresponding to yj to assist others,
she obtains an imitation privacy of ρI,M ≤ ε with high
probability (for large n).
Relationship with Differential Privacy One closely related
concept is differential privacy. The main goal of differential
privacy is to secure the privacy of data. In the context of
imitation privacy, the focus is the to secure the privacy of
both the data and learning model.
A competitor Alice may attempt to imitate the learning
service provided by Bob, through consecutively querying or
other side information. Such an imitation, if successful, will
cause an undesirable leakage of Bob’s black-box learning
capability. Below we give two examples to demonstrate that
differential privacy and imitation privacy do not imply each
other.
Example 6 (Ensured differential privacy and breached
imitation privacy). Suppose that Bob’s data XB contains n
i.i.d. observations of a random variable supported on [−b, b].
Bob can apply Laplacian mechanism to his data XB to get
α-locally deferentially private data X˜B , and then releases X˜B
to Alice.
However, the above mechanism typically does not admit a
non-vanishing imitation privacy (Definition 4, for any label
distribution pY ). For example, suppose that Bob uses a linear
regression model, then Alice can create the following imitation
system with a vanishing imitation privacy. For any queried y,
Alice calculates
βˆa = (X˜
T
BX˜B−τ2I)−1X˜TBy = (X˜TBX˜B−τ2I/n)−1(X˜TBy/n),
and uses
fM,y : x 7→ βˆTa x
for prediction, where τ2 = 8b2/α2 is the variance of the
Laplacian noise that could be estimated from Stage II if not
known to Alice. By the law of large numbers, the above βˆa
converges in probability to the same limit as Bob’s estimator
βˆb = (X
T
BXB)
−1XTBy.
This implies a vanishing imitation privacy as the data size n
becomes large.
Example 7 (Ensured imitation privacy and breached dif-
ferential privacy). Suppose that a module Bob is equipped
with a linear regression algorithm. Suppose that one predic-
tor/feature is released to the public, then his dataset will not
be differentially private at any privacy level. However, such
direct release of partial data will only decrease the imitation
privacy by a small amount. Alice still can not estimate the
functionality of Bob with arbitrary accuracy.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we define a new privacy notion at the
model level, named Imitation privacy, to address the emerging
privacy concerns in contemporary larges-scale cloud-based
machine learning services. We demonstrated applications of
the proposed notion in both classical MLaaS and recent multi-
organizational learning. Also, we discussed the fundamental
differences between our notion and data privacy. Interesting
future work includes computational methods to evaluate imita-
tion privacy for a variety of learning models on a case-by-case
basis.
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